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Rodney King's brutal beating, a Georgia trial judge
referring to a black defendant as a "colored boy,"1 jurors in
the same case speaking of black people as "colored" or
"niggers,"2 a Florida trial judge's reference to a black
defendant's parents as "niggers, prosecutorial bias in
charging decisions,4 and longer average sentences for blacks
than whites' all epitomize racial bias in our criminal justice
system. Not only does this racial bias have the effect of
usurping minority defendants' liberty, racial bias in the
criminal justice system destroys another fundamental right
for minority defendants: the right to vote. 6 Forty-eight states
deny convicted felons the right to vote through felon
disenfranchisement statutes.7 Based on the prevalence of
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1. Dobbs v. Zant, 720 F. Supp. 1566, 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1989), affd, 963 F.2d
1403 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 506 U.S. 357 (1993).
2. Id. at 1576.
3. Peek v. State, 488 So. 2d 52, 56 (Fla. 1986).
4. Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminating Discrimination in Administering the
Death Penalty: The Need for the Racial Justice Act, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
519, 521 (1995).
5. Id. at 521-22 (noting that average sentences for blacks are ten percent
greater than those imposed on whites).
6. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
7. Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 317 (2d Cir. 2006); Developments in the
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these laws and the presence of racial bias in the criminal
justice system, the potential for abuse against minorities is
high.8
Fortunately, an option may exist to lessen the sting of
these convictions: Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (Section
2). 9  Section 2 states that "[nlo voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting.., shall be imposed or applied by any
State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a
denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color . . ... , When
coupled with racial bias in the criminal justice system, felon
disenfranchisement statutes deny minority citizens the right
to vote." Accordingly, when racial bias results in an
unjustified felony conviction, a violation of Section 2 follows. 12
Unfortunately for affected minority felons, federal
appeals courts have not unanimously recognized a vote denial
claim under Section 2 based on the effect of racial bias in the
criminal justice system. 3 In Farrakhan v. Washington, the
Ninth Circuit held that a vote denial claim is cognizable
under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.'4 In his dissent
from a denial of a petition for rehearing en banc, however,
Judge Kozinski cast doubt on the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Farrakhan when he noted several constitutional concerns
about applying the Voting Rights Act to felon
disenfranchisement statutes.1" Similarly, the Second and the
Eleventh Circuits held in Hayden v. Pataki and Johnson v.
Governor of Florida that Section 2 does not encompass felon
disenfranchisement statutes. 6
Law: One Person, No Vote: The Laws of Felon Disenfranchisement, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 1939, 1942 (2002).
8. Only Maine and Vermont do not have laws disenfranchising felons.
Hayden, 449 F.3d at 317.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
10. Id. § 1973(a).
11. See Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 2003).
12. See id. at 1016.
13. See id. (holding that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act applied to felon
disenfranchisement statutes). But see Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir.
2006) (concluding that Section 2 did not apply to Florida's felon
disenfranchisement scheme); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214 (11th
Cir. 2005) (holding that Section 2 did not apply to Florida's felon
disenfranchisement scheme).
14. Farrakhan, 338 F.3d at 1016.
15. 359 F.3d 1116, 1121-24 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
16. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 328; Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1234.
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Significantly, the courts came to their conclusions
through very different approaches. In Farrakhan, the Ninth
Circuit arrived at its conclusion through an analysis of the
plain language of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.17 No
lengthy discussion of constitutionality, congressional intent,
or Congress's enforcement powers occurred in the Farrakhan
opinion." In contrast, while dissenting from the Ninth
Circuit's denial of a petition for rehearing en banc of
Farrakhan, Judge Kozinski argued that Section 2 does not
cover felon disenfranchisement statutes because Congress
never intended it to cover them and that interpreting Section
2 in such a manner jeopardizes the Section 2's
constitutionality."9 In Johnson, the Eleventh Circuit reversed
itself and concluded, like Judge Kozinski, that Section 2 does
not encompass felon disenfranchisement statutes by
analyzing the possibility of constitutional conflict, examining
Congress's intent, and reviewing Congress's enforcement
power under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 ° Similarly, in
Hayden, the Second Circuit concluded that Section 2 does not
cover felon disenfranchisement statutes by probing the
constitutional conflict and examining Congress's intent
regarding the scope of the Voting Rights Act.21
This comment explores the split among the Ninth,
Eleventh, and Second circuits on whether a cognizable vote
denial claim under the Voting Rights Act exists when applied
to felon disenfranchisement statutes in light of racial bias in
the criminal justice system.22 Part II of this comment reviews
the background of the problem and the rationale of the cases
giving rise to the circuit split.23 Part III identifies the
problem as the circuit split, potential constitutional conflicts,
and the need for clarity in the law so that Section 2 serves its
purpose.24 With the background and problem in mind, Part
IV examines each major legal issue involved in these
17. Farrakhan, 338 F.3d at 1014-16
18. Id. at 1009-22.
19. Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1120-25 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
20. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1229-34 (11th Cir. 2005).
21. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 310-29.
22. See infra Part II.C-F.
23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part III.
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decisions.2" Lastly, this comment advocates for a resolution to
the problem that calls for a revision of remedies sought and
the adoption of specific uses of statistical evidence to prove
racial bias in the criminal justice system.26
II. BACKGROUND: How DID WE GET TO WHERE WE ARE
TODAY?
Enacted in 1965 and amended in 1982 to its present day
language, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act contains broad
language prohibiting states from creating voting
qualifications that deny the right to vote because of race.27
Since 1986, applying Section 2 to felon disenfranchisement
laws has created confusion over whether Section 2
encompasses such laws because of the potential conflict
between Section 2's broad language and the Constitution.2"
A. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Totality of the
Circumstances Test
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act in 1965 for the
broad remedial purpose of ridding the country of racial
discrimination in voting.29 Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,
currently codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1973, 30 prohibits states from
25. See infra Part IV (discussing the broad language of the statute, the clear
statement rule, constitutional conflicts, and congressional intent).
26. See infra Part V.
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006).
28. Compare Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986) (assuming
without concluding that Section 2 encompasses felon disenfranchisement laws),
Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that a
cognizable claim exists under the Voting Rights Act with respect to felon
disenfranchisement statutes), and Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287
(11th Cir. 2003) (holding that Section 2 may encompass felon
disenfranchisement laws and that the district court therefore erred in
disregarding evidence of discrimination in the criminal justice system at the
summary judgment stage), with Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006)
(denying coverage under the Voting Rights Act for felon disenfranchisement
statutes), Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005) (reversing
its earlier conclusion that a claim exists), and Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d
102 (2d Cir. 2004) (concluding that Section 2 does not apply to a New York felon
disenfranchisement statute because of constitutional conflicts).
29. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966).
30. Section 2 currently states:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
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imposing any "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure ... which results in a denial
or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States
to vote on account of race."31 In 1982, Congress enacted 42
U.S.C. § 1973(b).12 This provision, known as "the totality of
circumstances test," states that a violation of Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act is established if, based on the totality of the
circumstances, it is shown that members of protected
minority groups have less opportunity than other members of
the electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice. 3
Several factors, known as the "Senate factors," determine
whether, by the totality of the circumstances, a voting
requirement violates Section 2.1' Notably, Congress did not
account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth
in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this
section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if,
based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class
of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its
members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been
elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance
which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section
establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in
numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
31. Id. § 1973(a).
32. Id. § 1973(b).
33. Id. Section 2 does not require proof of discriminatory intent. Id.
34. The list of "typical factors" from the Senate Report include:
(1) the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or
political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the
minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the
democratic process;
(2) the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political
subdivision is racially polarized;
(3) the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used
unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-
single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may
enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;
(4) if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of
the minority group have been denied access to that process;
(5) the extent to which members of the minority group in the state
or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas
as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to
186 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:48
intend for this list to be exclusive or exhaustive, nor did it
require plaintiffs to prove a particular number of factors.1
5
Instead, courts must consider how the challenged law
"interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an
inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white
voters to elect their preferred representatives."36 Under this
framework, claimants challenge felon disenfranchisement
statutes under the Voting Rights Act."
B. Wesley: The Sixth Circuit Assumes a Claim Exists But
Does Not Decide
In Wesley v. Collins, the Sixth Circuit first considered
whether a vote dilution claim existed under Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act when statistical evidence suggested that
Tennessee's felon disenfranchisement statute
disproportionately affected blacks.3" In addition to
challenging the validity of the statute under Section 2, the
plaintiff, a black citizen of Tennessee, challenged the statute
under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution. 9 The Wesley court assumed, without expressly
deciding, that the Voting Rights Act applied and evaluated
the plaintiffs vote dilution claim.4 °
participate effectively in the political process;
(6) whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or
subtle racial appeals;
(7) the extent to which members of the minority group have been
elected to public office in the jurisdiction;
(8) whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part
of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the
minority group;
(9) whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's
use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice or procedure is tenuous.
S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-
07.
35. Id. at 29.
36. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986).
37. See, e.g., Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006) (challenging
New York's felon disenfranchisement scheme); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405
F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005) (challenging Florida's felon disenfranchisement
scheme); Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003) (challenging
Washington's felon disenfranchisement scheme).
38. Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1260-61 (6th Cir. 1986).
39. Id. at 1257.
40. See id. at 1259-63.
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First, the Wesley court examined the language of Section
2 and noted that plaintiffs establish a violation if, based upon
the totality of the circumstances, the challenged legislation
results in unlawful vote dilution.41 Next, the court observed
that the 1982 amendment to Section 2 eliminated the
requirement of proving discriminatory intent and explained
that, in order to establish a Section 2 violation, plaintiffs
must either prove discriminatory intent or demonstrate that
the challenged system or practice in the context of all the
circumstances in the jurisdiction results in minorities being
denied equal access to the political process.42 Additionally,
the court noted that courts should apply the "Senate factors"
when determining whether the challenged practice violates
Section 2." Notably, the Wesley court stated that "[t]he
determination of whether a plaintiff has proven that the
challenged legislation results in vote dilution under Section 2
based on the 'totality of the circumstances' requires a highly
individualistic inquiry."44
Turning to the plaintiffs main argument that
Tennessee's law "disproportionately impacts . . . blacks
because a significantly higher number of black Tennesseeans
[sic] are convicted of felonies than whites,"45 the court
explained that proof of a disproportionate racial impact alone
did not establish a per se violation of the Voting Rights Act.46
In addition to considering the disparate impact evidence, the
court explained that it was under an obligation to review the
interaction of the challenged legislation with historical, social,
and political factors generally probative of vote dilution.
Reviewing these factors, the court concluded that, under the
totality of the circumstances, Tennessee's felon
disenfranchisement statute did not violate the Voting Rights
Act.48 In support of its conclusion, the Wesley court alluded to
social contract rationales and the states' constitutional right
to disenfranchise convicted felons under the Fourteenth
41. Id. at 1259-60.
42. Id. at 1260.
43. Id.
44. Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1260.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1260-61.
47. Id. at 1261.
48. Id.
2008] 187
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Amendment.49
In sum, the Wesley court assumed that Section 2 applied
to felon disenfranchisement statutes and concluded that,
under the totality of the circumstances presented by the
plaintiff, Tennessee's law did not violate Section 2.50 The
Sixth Circuit did not expressly hold that Section 2 applied to
felon disenfranchisement statutes.51 Future courts analyzed
this problem much differently.
C. Farrakhan: The Ninth Circuit Recognizes the Claim
As the first to recognize a felon disenfranchisement vote
denial claim under Section 2, the Ninth Circuit, in Farrakhan
v. Washington,52  concluded that when felon
disenfranchisement statutes result in denial of the right to
vote because of race, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
provides disenfranchised felons a means to seek redress.53 In
Farrakhan, convicted felons of several racial minority
groups 54  challenged both the felon disenfranchisement
provision of Washington's Constitution and Washington's
method of restoring voting rights to felons who completed
their sentences as violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act." More specifically, the plaintiffs sought both declaratory
and injunctive relief to enjoin the State of Washington and
the other defendants from applying the felon
disenfranchisement provisions to all felons.56 In support of
their claim, the plaintiffs offered statistical evidence showing
disparities in arrest, pre-trial release rates, charging
decisions, and sentencing outcomes in Washington's criminal
justice system.57 In addition to the statistical evidence, the
plaintiffs offered expert declarations and evidence of
discriminatory intent that guided the enactment of felon
49. Id. at 1261-62.
50. Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1261.
51. Id. at 1255-61.
52. Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003).
53. Id. at 1016.
54. Id. at 1012 n.2. The plaintiffs were African American, Native American,
and Hispanic American. Id.
55. Id. at 1012. The defendants were the State of Washington, Washington
Governor Gary Locke, Washington Secretary of State Sam Reed, and Secretary
of the Washington State Department of Corrections Joseph Lehman. Id.
56. Id.




Beginning its analysis, the Farrakhan court recognized
that Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act to rid the
country of racial discrimination in voting.5 9 Second, the court
explained that Congress amended Section 2 in 1982 intending
to remove the requirement of proving discriminatory intent.6 °
Next, the Farrakhan court reviewed the amended version of
Section 2,61 noted the presence of the language "based on the
totality of the circumstances" 62 and concluded that a plaintiff
"may establish a Section 2 violation by showing that, based
on of [sic] the totality of the circumstances, the challenged
voting practice results in discrimination on account of race. 63
Like the Wesley court, the Farrakhan court discussed the nine
"Senate factors" that may be relevant in determining
whether, in the totality of the circumstances, Section 2 has
been violated.64 Lastly, the Ninth Circuit recognized that
under Thornburg v. Gingles,65 courts must consider how the
challenged practice interacts with social and historical
conditions to produce "inequality in the opportunities enjoyed
by black and white voters to elect their preferred
representatives."66
After making the above observations, the Farrakhan
court concluded that Section 2 creates a cognizable vote
denial claim for felon disenfranchisement statutes operating
to deny of the right to vote on account of race. In reaching
this conclusion, the court observed that "Section 2 is clear
that any voting qualification that denies citizens the right to
vote in a discriminatory manner violates the [Voting Rights
Act]."68 The Farrakhan court reasoned that felon
disenfranchisement statutes are included in the meaning of
Section 2 because felon disenfranchisement is a voting
58. Farrakhan, 338 F.3d at 1013.
59. Id. at 1014 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315
(1966)).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1014-15.
62. Id. at 1015.
63. Id.
64. Farrakhan, 338 F.3d at 1015.
65. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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qualification.69 In support of its conclusion that Section 2
applies to felon disenfranchisement statutes, the court
followed the U.S. Supreme Court's holding that states cannot
use felon disenfranchisement as a mechanism to discriminate
based on race. 70  Additionally, the court supported its
conclusion by explaining that Congress purposefully amended
the Voting Rights Act to ensure that, under all the
circumstances in a particular jurisdiction, "any disparate
racial impact of facially neutral voting requirements did not
result from racial discrimination."'" Finally, the court argued
that the policy of allowing felons to challenge felon
disenfranchisement laws that deny the right to vote because
of race "animates the right that every citizen has of protection
against racially discriminatory voting practices."72
Thus, Farrakhan pioneered the view that a cognizable
claim exists under Section 2 for felon disenfranchisement
statutes that result in vote denial because of race.73 Others
disagreed.
D. Judge Kozinski Dissents and Casts Doubt on the Claim
After the Ninth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en
banc,74 Judge Kozinski submitted a detailed dissenting
opinion expressing concerns about the use of statistical
evidence in vote denial claims,75 the constitutionality of
interpreting Section 2 to apply to felon disenfranchisement, 76
Congress's intent,7 7 and the consequences of allowing vote
denial claims to be established by disparate impact
evidence.78
Judge Kozinski began his dissenting opinion by
evaluating the plaintiffs' statistical evidence. 79 First, he
concluded that the plaintiffs' evidence established only
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985)).
71. Id.
72. Farrakhan, 338 F.3d at 1016.
73. See id.
74. Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004).
75. Id. at 1117-19 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 1121-25.
77. Id. at 1120-21.
78. Id. at 1125-26.
79. Id. at 1117.
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statistical disparities and not intentional discrimination. 0
Next, he expressed concerns about the reliability of statistical
evidence by noting that the plaintiffs' own expert admitted
that statistical disparities have complex causes.8 1 Judge
Kozinski argued that statistical disparities alone are not
enough to establish a vote denial claim under Section 2.2 To
support this view, he reviewed case law from other circuits on
the same issue and maintained that the other circuits had not
recognized statistical disparities as sufficient to establish a
vote denial claim under the Voting Rights Act. 3
In addition to expressing concerns about statistical
evidence, Judge Kozinski explained that a violation of Section
2 is established by evaluating the totality of the
circumstances under which the challenged law operates to
determine whether the plaintiffs have been denied the right
to vote based on their race. 4 Judge Kozinski asserted that
the plaintiffs did not provide evidence relating to any of the
nine "Senate factors." 5 Next, he concluded that the plaintiffs
did not meet their burden of producing evidence showing vote
denial on account of race. 6 In support of his conclusion,
Judge Kozinski explained that plaintiffs in other circuits have
lost their Section 2 vote claims with stronger evidence and
argued that the panel's decision tried to "pass off evidence of
disparities as evidence of intentional discrimination."7
Significantly, he admitted that intentional discrimination in
the criminal justice system could result in illegal vote denial
on account of race if it interacts with a voting practice. 8
After arguing that the totality of the circumstances test
was not satisfied, Judge Kozinski turned to Congress's
80. Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
81. Id. The inference from the expert's admission is that a factor other than
racial discrimination caused the statistical disparities in felon
disenfranchisement among minorities and non-minorities.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1118-19.
84. Id. at 1119.
85. Id.
86. Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
87. Id.
88. Id. The admission implicitly recognizes a cognizable claim under
Section 2 for felon disenfranchisement statutes.
20081
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intended scope of the Voting Rights Act.8 9 First, he observed
that when Congress originally enacted the Voting Rights Act
in 1965, it exempted felon disenfranchisement statutes from
another section of the Voting Rights Act.90 Additionally, he
explained that when Congress amended the Voting Rights
Act in 1982, it made no mention of felon disenfranchisement
laws. 91 Judge Kozinski also noted that Congress enacted
other laws that aid states in disenfranchising felons. 92
Finally, he concluded that Congress was not concerned about
felon disenfranchisement when it enacted the Voting Rights
Act.9 3
Next, Judge Kozinski expressed his concern about the
constitutionality of extending the Voting Rights Act to apply
to felon disenfranchisement laws.94  Congress's power to
enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and a
conflict with the text of the Fourteenth Amendment
concerned him the most.9" Judge Kozinski observed that the
Fourteenth Amendment expressly endorses felon
disenfranchisement laws,96 that felon disenfranchisement
laws are presumptively constitutional, 97 and that only when
states enact felon disenfranchisement laws "with an
invidious, racially discriminatory purpose" are they
unconstitutional. 98  Additionally, he explained that
unconstitutional enactments of felon disenfranchisement laws
are "exceedingly rare. "99
After noting the conflict with the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Judge Kozinski turned to Congress's
enforcement powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. 100 He explained that courts must review the
89. Id. at 1119-20.
90. Id. at 1120 (discussing the content and legislative history of 42 U.S.C. §
1973b(c), a different section than Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act).
91. Id.




95. Id. at 1121-24.
96. Id. at 1121.
97. Id.
98. Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116,. 1121 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Kozinski, J. dissenting).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1122.
192 [Vo1:48
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"congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end" in
order to ensure that Congress does not alter a substantive
right in an attempt to enforce it. 1 1 Reviewing Congress's
record, Judge Kozinski found no evidence of constitutional
violations, and concluded that extending the Voting Rights
Act to felon disenfranchisement laws fails the "congruence
and proportionality test."'' 2  In conclusion, he affirmed his
constitutional avoidance view by explaining that courts "have
a duty to recognize limitations on congressional power and
avoid interpreting statutes in a way that would extend those
powers beyond constitutional limits.' 0 3
Concluding his dissent, Judge Kozinski feared that the
consequences of extending Section 2 to felon
disenfranchisement laws reached too far. 04 In support of this
assertion, he argued that the panel's decision "require[s]
states to erect voting booths in prisons."0 5 For additional
support, he noted the prevalence of felon disenfranchisement
laws in the circuit, 1°' and argued that allowing statistical
disparities to prove Section 2 violations could potentially
invalidate many voting regulations.107
Significantly, Judge Kozinski's dissent would influence
other circuits' conclusions about extending the Voting Rights
Act to reach felon disenfranchisement laws. 0 8
E. Johnson: The Eleventh Circuit Reverses Its Position
Reconsidering its initial decision in Johnson v. Governor
101. Id. (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)). This
language, known as the "congruence and proportionality test," examines
whether a law exceeds Congress's authority to enforce the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 519-20.
102. Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Kozinski, J. dissenting).




107. Id. at 1125-26.
108. See, e.g., Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005)
(reversing an earlier decision that recognized a cognizable claim under Section 2
for felon disenfranchisement laws). Notably, Judge Kravitch, who authored the
opinion, dissented on substantially similar grounds when the Eleventh Circuit
initially considered this question. See Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d
1287, 1314-19 (11th Cir. 2003) (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
2008]
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of Florida,"°9 the Eleventh Circuit granted a rehearing en
banc." Like Judge Kozinski, the en banc court concluded
that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not apply to felon
disenfranchisement laws.'
Beginning its review, the Eleventh Circuit mentioned the
circuit split over whether Section 2 applies to felon
disenfranchisement laws. 112  After briefly noting that
Congress's purpose in enacting the Voting Rights Act was to
eliminate racially discriminatory voting practices," 3 the court
recognized that Section 2 prohibits voting practices that deny
minorities the right to vote because of race and allows
plaintiffs to prove violations by examining the totality of the
circumstances."' Next, the Eleventh Circuit began to explore
potential constitutional conflicts." 5
Searching for constitutional conflicts in applying Section
2 to felon disenfranchisement laws, the Johnson en banc
court examined the language of Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment pertaining to felon disenfranchisement."16 The
court recognized that "the exclusion of felons from the vote
has an affirmative sanction in section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment."" 7 In light of this language, the Johnson en
banc court concluded that interpreting Section 2 to deny a
state the discretion to disenfranchise felons raised a
constitutional issue because that interpretation allows a
federal statute to override the text of the Constitution.18
109. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003). The
Eleventh Circuit previously concluded that Section 2 could apply to felon
disenfranchisement statutes. Id. at 1306. To support its initial conclusion, the
Eleventh Circuit noted the broad language of Section 2. Id. at 1303.
110. Id. at 1287, reh'g en banc granted, 377 F.3d 1163, 1163-64 (11th Cir.
2004).
111. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1234 (11th Cir. 2005). The
plaintiffs sought to invalidate Florida's felon disenfranchisement scheme. Id. at
1216. In addition to following Judge Kozinski's reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit
also adhered to an earlier Second Circuit decision disapproving of a claim under
the Voting Rights Act for felon disenfranchisement statutes. See Muntaqim v.
Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 130 (2d Cir. 2003).
112. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1227.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1227-28.
115. Id. at 1228-31.
116. Id. at 1228 (noting the words "except for participation in rebellion, or
other crime" in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
117. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1228-29 (quoting Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S.
24, 54 (1974)).
118. Id. at 1229.
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Realizing this conflict, the Eleventh Circuit turned to an
analysis of the clear statement rule. 119 After noting the
conflict with Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Johnson en banc court explained that Congress's enforcement
powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment may
conflict with applying Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to
felon disenfranchisement laws. 120  The court expressed
concerns about the "congruence and proportionality" of
applying the Voting Rights Act to ban felon
disenfranchisement laws because a federal statute would be
read as limiting a state's constitutionally delegated power.
121
Supporting this concern, the Johnson en banc court
recognized that "[flor Congress to enact proper enforcement
legislation, there must be a record of constitutional
violations.1 22  After finding that there was a complete
absence of congressional findings that felon
disenfranchisement laws were used to discriminate against
minority voters, the court, analogizing to Oregon v.
Mitchell,23 concluded that applying Section 2 to Florida's
felon disenfranchisement law would force the court to
consider whether Congress exceeded its enforcement powers
under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 24
Since the Johnson en banc court found that applying
Section 2 to felon disenfranchisement laws created
constitutional concerns with respect to the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Congress's enforcement
powers, 125 it moved on to examine, under the clear statement
rule, the question of whether Congress intended such a
conflict.1 26  Like Judge Kozinski, the court reviewed the
legislative history of the Voting Rights Act's original
enactment in 1965 and found that Congress intended to
119. See id. The "clear statement rule" states that "[i]f Congress intends to
alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal
Government, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
120. See Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1230 (11th Cir. 2005).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1231.
123. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). In Mitchell, the Court
concluded that Congress had made no legislative findings that states used an
age requirement to disenfranchise voters on account of race. Id.
124. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1231.
125. Id. at 1230-31.
126. Id. at 1232.
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exempt felon disenfranchisement statutes from Section 4 of
the Voting Rights Act. '27 Also like Judge, Kozinski, the en
banc court reviewed the legislative history from the 1982
amendment to the Voting Rights Act and found no mention of
felon disenfranchisement. 128  Accordingly, the Johnson en
banc court concluded that Section 2 does not apply to felon
disenfranchisement laws because Congress expressed its
intent to exclude such laws from coverage under the Voting
Rights Act.129
F. Hayden: The Second Circuit Double Checks
Reviewing an earlier decision, Muntaqim v. Coombe,3 °
the Second Circuit reconsidered its view on applying Section
2 to felon disenfranchisement laws in Hayden v. Pataki.'3'
The Second Circuit consolidated Hayden and Muntaqim and
heard both appeals en banc.'32 In Hayden, the plaintiffs
challenged New York's felon disenfranchisement law with
both a vote denial claim and a vote dilution claim under
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 133 They sought to have the
statute invalidated. 34
Turning to the issue of felon disenfranchisement, the
Second Circuit began its discussion by reviewing the
language of Section 2.135 The Hayden court noted Section 2's
broad language prohibiting any voting qualification or
standard that results in the denial of the right to vote on
account of race. 36 Despite this broad language, the court
concluded that Congress did not intend Section 2 to include
felon disenfranchisement laws for several reasons. 137
Among these reasons were the text of Section 2 of the
127. Id. at 1232-33.
128. Id. at 1233-34.
129. Id. at 1234.
130. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2004). In Muntaqim, the
Second Circuit concluded that Section 2 does not apply to felon
disenfranchisement laws. Id. at 130. In reaching this conclusion, the
Muntaqim court evaluated the language of Section 2, the clear statement rule,
constitutional conflicts, and Congress's intent. Id. at 115-28.
131. Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006).
132. Id. at 312.
133. Id. at 311.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 313.
136. Id.
137. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 315-16.
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Fourteenth Amendment and the long history of
disenfranchising felons. First, the Hayden court reviewed the
words "except for participation in rebellion, or other crime" in
the Fourteenth Amendment. 138  Next, the court explained
that, because of this language, the Supreme Court has held
that felon disenfranchisement statutes are presumptively
constitutional. 139  Lastly, the Hayden court reviewed the
history of felon disenfranchisement and found that the
practice was prevalent in ancient Greece, Medieval
continental countries, the early American Colonies, and
present day America. 140 Based on the Constitution's text and
the history of felon disenfranchisement, the Second Circuit
concluded that it was unlikely that Congress intended to
amend Section 2 in a way that would bring felon
disenfranchisement laws within its scope.14
1
Moving to a review of Congress's intent, the Hayden
court examined the legislative history of the 1965 enactment
of the Voting Rights Act, attempts to amend the Voting
Rights Act to include felon disenfranchisement laws
expressly, the legislative history of the 1982 amendments to
the Voting Rights Act, and subsequent congressional acts
regarding felon disenfranchisement.12  To start, the court
explained that Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act to
banish racial discrimination in voting.143 Turning to the 1965
enactment, the Second Circuit observed that Congress
specifically excluded felon disenfranchisement from Section 4
of the Voting Rights Act.144 Arguing that Congress did not
understand Section 2 to encompass felon disenfranchisement
laws, the court recognized Congress's unsuccessful attempts
to amend Section 2 to include felon disenfranchisement
laws. 145  Additionally, the Second Circuit explained that
Congress enacted a felon disenfranchisement statute in the
District of Columbia shortly after the passing of the Voting
Rights Act and concluded that it was unlikely that Congress
would pass a felon disenfranchisement law shortly after it
138. Id. at 316.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 316-17.
141. Id. at 317.
142. Id. at 317-22.
143. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 317-18.
144. Id. at 318.
145. Id. at 319-20.
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allegedly forbade it on the national level. 146  The Hayden
court then argued that the absence of any indication that the
Voting Rights Act applied to felon disenfranchisement
statutes in the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act
indicates that Congress did not intend such statutes to be
covered.147  Lastly, the court contended that subsequent
congressional actions, such as making it easier for states to
exclude convicted felons from lists of eligible voters, 48
demonstrate that Congress assumed that the Voting Rights
Act did not apply to felon disenfranchisement statutes. 49
Based on these observations, the Hayden court concluded that
Congress did not intend the Voting Rights Act to cover felon
disenfranchisement statutes.1 0
To confirm its conclusion that Section 2 does not apply to
felon disenfranchisement laws, the Second Circuit examined
"the clear statement rule." 1 The Second Circuit explained
that Congress must "make its intent 'unmistakably clear'
when enacting statutes that would alter the usual
constitutional balance between the Federal Government and
the States."5 2 Next, the Hayden court observed that applying
Section 2 to felon disenfranchisement would alter the
constitutional balance by contradicting the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and by interfering with the states'
regulation of the franchise, the states' authority to craft its
criminal law, and the regulation of correctional institutions.15 3
The court then considered whether Congress made a clear
statement of its intention to alter the federal balance and
concluded, in light of its discussion of the legislative history of
the Voting Rights Act, that Congress made no such
statement. 154
Based on the above reasons, the Hayden court affirmed
its holding in Muntaqim that Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act does not apply to felon disenfranchisement statutes.'55
146. Id. at 320.
147. Id. at 320-21.
148. Id. at 322.
149. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 322.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 323-24.
152. Id. (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)).
153. Id. at 326-28.
154. Id. at 328.
155. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 328.
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III. THE PROBLEM: TODAY THE CIRCUITS ARE SPLIT, BUT WHY
Do WE CARE?
The preceding discussion illustrates that the state of the
law on this subject is far from settled. While the Ninth
Circuit accepts the application of Section 2 to felon
disenfranchisement laws,156 the Second and Eleventh Circuits
do not recognize the application of Section 2 to such laws.'57
The inter-circuit tension arises from a conflict between the
broad statutory text, the constitutional guarantees of rights
to the states, and Congress's intent to create such a conflict. 158
Resolving the conflict between the circuit courts will clarify
the meaning of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act for litigants
and judges. Importantly, such a resolution must promote the
purpose of the Voting Rights Act while navigating through
the constitutional problems. Resolving this conflict could
have a profound impact on future elections.
IV. ANALYSIS: IS THERE REALLY A CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM
HERE?
The main points of contention between the circuits are
Section 2's broad language and the constitutionality of
applying Section 2 to felon disenfranchisement statutes.
Fortunately, litigants advocating for individual remedies
overcome every potential constitutional barrier.
A. Broad Language + Totality of the Circumstances = A
Cognizable Claim
Section 2 prohibits states from imposing or applying any
voting qualification in a manner "which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race or color."'5 9 Felon disenfranchisement
laws are a voting qualification because being qualified to vote
requires that the citizen have no felony conviction that would
trigger the application of the felon disenfranchisement
statute.' If felon disenfranchisement is triggered by a felony
156. Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003), reh'g en baric
denied, 359 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2004).
157. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 328; Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214,
1234 (11th Cir. 2005).
158. See supra Part II.A-F and accompanying notes.
159. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006).
160. Farrakhan, 338 F.3d at 1016.
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conviction marred by racial discrimination, the felon
disenfranchisement law denies the felon the right to vote on
account of race.16 ' Therefore, felon disenfranchisement laws
functioning in such a manner violate Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act.
Significantly, Section 2 contemplates showing evidence of
racial bias in the criminal justice system to prove a violation.
In relevant part, Section 2 states that plaintiffs establish a
violation if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is
demonstrated that minorities have less opportunity than
other citizens to participate in elections. 62 To determine
whether the "totality of the circumstances test" has been
satisfied, the Senate provided a list of factors for courts to
consider.163 Significantly, the list of factors is not exclusive.
16 4
Therefore, courts can consider evidence of racial bias in the
criminal justice system even if such evidence is not included
within the purview of factor five. 6 ' Furthermore, the
Supreme Court directed courts to consider how the law
"interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an
inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white
voters to elect their preferred representatives.' 66
Accordingly, courts should allow evidence of racial bias in the
criminal justice system to establish a violation of Section 2.167
Since a plain reading of Section 2's language
encompasses felon disenfranchisement laws and the totality
161. See id.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006).
163. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
177, 206-07. Perhaps most relevant to racial bias in the criminal justice system,
factor five allows courts to consider "the extent to which members of the
minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of
discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which
hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process." Id. at 29.
This factor demonstrates Congress's intent to allow courts to review
surrounding social circumstances. See Farrakhan, 338 F.3d at 1019.
164. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 29 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,
207.
165. See id. Factor five allows courts to consider "the extent to which
members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the
effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health,
which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process." Id.
166. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986).
167. See Farrakhan, 338 F.3d at 1020 (noting that evidence of racial bias in




of the circumstances test allows consideration of evidence of
racial bias in the criminal justice system, a cognizable claim
exists under Section 2 for felon disenfranchisement laws that
disenfranchise minorities because of racial bias in the
criminal justice system. However, depending on the remedy
sought by the litigant, such an application may create
constitutional conflicts that prevent courts from applying
Section 2 to felon disenfranchisement laws.
B. Clear Statement Rule
When an interpretation of a federal statute would alter
the constitutional balance between the states and the federal
government, the clear statement rule requires Congress to
make its intention to do so unmistakably clear. 168
1. Constitutional Conflicts
When litigants attempt to invalidate felon
disenfranchisement laws under Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, constitutional conflicts arise from the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 169 Congress's enforcement power
with respect to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 10
and other areas designated for state regulation. 71
a. The Fourteenth Amendment
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment states "when the
right to vote at any election . . . is denied to any male
inhabitants of such State .. .or in any way abridged, except
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced." 72 Based on this
language, the Supreme Court has explained that "the
exclusion of felons from the vote has an affirmative sanction
in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, a sanction which
was not present in the case of the other restrictions on the
168. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
169. Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 326 (2d Cir. 2006).
170. Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1122-24 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (discussing concerns about Congress's enforcement
power in applying Section 2 to felon disenfranchisement laws).
171. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 326-28 (discussing the conflict between applying
Section 2 to felon disenfranchisement laws and the important state interest in
regulating the franchise, the state's criminal law, and its correctional facilities).
172. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
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franchise which were invalidated ....* As a result, felon
disenfranchisement laws are presumptively constitutional. 174
When litigants seek to invalidate felon
disenfranchisement statutes under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, a constitutional conflict arises because litigants
ask courts to interpret Section 2 as allowing a federal statute
to deprive the states of constitutionally guaranteed discretion
to disenfranchise felons. 7  Accordingly, the clear statement
rule requires that Congress make an affirmative statement
that it intended such a conflict. 176  In contrast, if litigants
seek an alternative remedy that does not require the statute
to be invalidated, no conflict between Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act and Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment exists
because the two statutes would be able to coexist. The felon
disenfranchisement statute can function in a manner that
does not violate Section 2, and Section 2 can function in a
manner that does not conflict with the states' constitutionally
guaranteed discretion to disenfranchise felons. 177
When litigants advocate for the abrogation of felon
disenfranchisement laws under Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, Congress's enforcement powers under the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments also come into question.
b. Congress's Enforcement Powers
Congress enacted Section 2 pursuant to the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments. 78  Importantly, both the
Fourteenth and the Fifteenth Amendments grant Congress
the power to enforce the rights they confer by enacting
appropriate legislation. 17 9 For legislation to be an appropriate
173. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974).
174. See id.
175. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 316; Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214,
1229 (11th Cir. 2005); Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 122 (2d Cir. 2004)
(observing the presumptive constitutionality of state felon disenfranchisement
laws).
176. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 323-24.
177. See id. at 362-63 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (observing the difference
between a categorical ban on felon disenfranchisement statutes and a ban on
such statutes that result in the denial of voting rights on the basis of race).
178. See infra note 186.
179. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."); U.S. CONST.




exercise of Congress's enforcement power, "[t]here must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."18 0
In addition to congruence and proportionality, the Supreme
Court has required Congress to support its enforcement
legislation by a record of constitutional violations.18 1  Based
on this framework, some courts have concluded that applying
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act would exceed Congress's
enforcement powers82
To support this argument, these courts observed a lack of
a congressional record of a vast use of felon
disenfranchisement statutes by states to deny minorities the
opportunity to vote 183  and Supreme Court decisions
invalidating enforcement legislation due to the absence of a
record of constitutional violations."' Notably, these Supreme
Court cases dealt with age and disability discrimination.8 5
None of these cases dealt directly with racial discrimination
in voting. Accordingly, they are not necessarily relevant in
the case of applying Section 2 to felon disenfranchisement
laws. Furthermore, focusing all the attention on the
congruence and proportionality test ignores additional
constitutional authority Congress used to enact Section 2 and
the 1982 amendments: Article I, Section 4.186
180. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). The Court has
described Congress's Fifteenth Amendment enforcement powers as parallel to
its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers. See id. at 518.
181. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001).
182. Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 118-26 (2d Cir. 2004); Johnson v.
Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005).
183. E.g., Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1231.
184. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374
(2001) (finding that the Americans with Disabilities Act was an invalid attempt
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment because Congress did not make findings
of irrational job discrimination by the states); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (holding that Congress failed to compile evidence of
irrational age discrimination to apply the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act to the States); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 130 (1970) (observing a lack
of findings that the twenty-one year-old voting requirement was used by states
to disenfranchise voters on account of race).
185. See cases cited supra note 184. This observation is significant because
the prohibition against racial discrimination in voting is textual in the Fifteenth
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of the citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.").
186. In addition to enforcing the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
Congress also designed the Voting Rights Act to enforce Article 1, Section 4.
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Furthermore, if litigants sought an alternative remedy to
invalidating the disenfranchisement law, concerns over
"congruence and proportionality" and the lack of findings
diminish. For example, if litigants seek to have their right to
vote reinstated because their disenfranchisement resulted
from racial bias in the criminal justice system, applying
Section 2 in such a case is consistent with Congress's original
finding of a vast history of racial discrimination in voting
rights.18 7 Moreover, an individual remedy is congruent and
proportional to the Voting Rights Act's purpose of ridding the
country of racial discrimination in voting because it affords
felons a remedy to the injury of disenfranchisement due to
racial bias in the criminal justice system.1 88
c. Interference with Other State Interests
In addition to the aforementioned concerns, the Hayden
court argued that applying Section 2 to felon
disenfranchisement laws alters the constitutional balance by
implicating the regulation of the franchise, the states'
authority to craft its criminal law, and the regulation of
correctional institutions.8 9 Although the court mentioned no
constitutional provisions, it appears that the Hayden court
referred to the "Times, Places and Manner" Clause1 90 and the
general powers given to the states under the Tenth
Amendment. 9 ' As with the other constitutional concerns,
when litigants advocate for the categorical ban of felon
disenfranchisement laws as a remedy under Section 2, a
conflict between the Voting Rights Act and the states' right to
H.R. REP. No. 89-439, 1 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437. The
1982 amendments of Section 2 also relied on Article 1, Section 4 in creating the
totality of circumstances test and eliminating the discriminatory intent
requirement. S. REP. No. 97-417, 39 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
177, 217; Daniel Martin Katz, Article I Section 4 of the Constitution, the Voting
Rights Act and the Restoration of the Congressional Portion of the Election
Ballot: The Final Frontier of Felon Disenfranchisement Jurisprudence?, 10 J.L.
& SOC. CHANGE (forthcoming manuscript, available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=962385).
187. Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 121 (noting that Congress had a record of racial
discrimination when it enacted the Voting Rights Act and lacked a record when
it enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
188. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315-16 (1966).
189. Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 326 (2d Cir. 2006).
190. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
191. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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regulate the time, place, and manner of elections arises
because it takes away the states' control over the franchise.
Similarly, such a remedy creates a conflict between Section 2
and the states' authority over its criminal law and its prisons
because the states traditionally regulate these two areas.
As with the other constitutional concerns, litigants can
alleviate the conflicts by advocating for an alternative remedy
that does not require invalidation of the felon
disenfranchisement law. The application of Section 2 to felon
disenfranchisement laws can coexist with the states'
constitutional rights. If the states do not enact or administer
laws that deny the right to vote on account of race and if the
Section 2 litigant requests an alternative remedy that does
not mandate invalidation of the felon disenfranchisement
law, then the states retain their right to regulate the
franchise, fashion their criminal law, and regulate their
prisons. Significantly, felons who have lost their right to vote
due to the interaction of racial bias in the criminal justice
system and felon disenfranchisement statutes also retain a
remedy under Section 2. In other words, the constitutional
balance remains intact while a Section 2 remedy exists.
In sum, a different remedy avoids the application of the
clear statement rule. Accordingly, consideration of whether
Congress made a "clear statement" is unnecessary. However,
assuming that it is necessary, Congress's intent must be
examined.
2. Congress's Intent
Under the "clear statement rule," once a court determines
that a particular interpretation of a federal statute would
alter the constitutional balance between the state and federal
governments, it must also determine whether Congress has
made its intent to do so unmistakably clear. 192  After
determining that applying Section 2 to felon
disenfranchisement laws alters the constitutional balance,
courts have tried several approaches to show Congress's
intent. For example, some courts examined the legislative
history of the 1965 enactment of the Voting Rights Act,193
192. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (quoting Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
193. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 318; Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214,
1232-33 (11th Cir. 2005); Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 128 (2d Cir.
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subsequent attempts by Congress to expressly include felon
disenfranchisement laws, 194 and the 1982 amendments of the
Voting Rights Act.' 95 Other examples used by courts include
the enactment of a felon disenfranchisement law by Congress
in the District of Columbia 196 and recent laws allowing states
to remove convicted felons from their lists of eligible voters. 197
Based on the above information, these courts concluded that
Congress never intended Section 2 to cover felon
disenfranchisement statutes. 19 Such a conclusion does not
logically follow.
When discussing Section 4(c) of the Voting Rights Act,' 99
which bans "tests or devices" that limit the ability to vote to
citizens with "good moral character, "2u ° the Senate Judiciary
Committee stated that the section "would not result in the
proscription of the frequent requirement of States and
political subdivisions that an applicant for voting ... be free
of conviction of a felony or mental disability."2 °' Based on
that statement, some courts have found this to be evidence
that Congress did not intend Section 2 to include felon
disenfranchisement statutes.2 2
Several assumptions embed themselves in this
conclusion. To start, such a conclusion assumes that a
statement about one section of a statute applies to all
sections. Furthermore, such a position violates several well-
established statutory interpretation doctrines.2°3 Moreover, it
2004).
194. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 322.
195. Id. at 320-21; Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1233-34; Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 128.
196. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 320.
197. Id. at 322.
198. Id.; Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1234; Muntaqim, 366 F.3d at 128.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(c) (2006).
200. Id.
201. S. REP. NO. 89-162, at 24 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508,
2562.
202. See, e.g., Hayden, 449 F.3d at 318-19 (discussing the exclusion of felon
disenfranchisement laws in Section 4 as evidence that Congress did not intend
Section 2 to apply to felon disenfranchisement laws).
203. First, courts taking this approach misuse legislative history. An
analysis of legislative history is proper only to solve, but not to create, an
ambiguity. Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 421 (1899); Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984). Section 2's language is not ambiguous. Thus, courts
misuse the Voting Rights Act's legislative history to conclude that Congress did
not intend Section 2 to reach felon disenfranchisement statutes. Second, such
an approach imputes the language and legislative history of Section 4(c) into
Section 2. However, "[iut is a general principle of statutory construction that
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assumes that all sections of the Voting Rights Act have the
same purpose and scope. In fact, they do not. Section 2 and
Section 4 have different purposes, language, and scope. °4
Thus, the legislative history of Section 4 is not necessarily
applicable to Section 2. Finally, such reasoning ignores the
plausible conclusion that Congress intended Section 2 to
include felon disenfranchisement because it expressly
excluded it from Section 4 and made no such exclusion in
Section 2.
One court construed subsequent attempts in the 1970's
by legislators to amend the Voting Rights Act as evidence
that Congress did not understand the Voting Rights Act to
apply to felon disenfranchisement laws.20 5 This conclusion
ignores alternative explanations for the attempts to amend
the statute. Despite its broad language, it is entirely
plausible that these legislators wanted to eliminate any
possible confusion about applying Section 2 to felon
disenfranchisement statutes. Furthermore, none of the
proposed amendments passed, which suggests that Congress
did not feel that the amendments were necessary.2 6
Accordingly, it does not necessarily follow that attempts to
amend the statute to include felon disenfranchisement laws
demonstrates Congress's belief that such laws were not
already included.
Congress amended Section 2 in 1982 to allow plaintiffs to
establish violations by the "totality of the circumstances
test."20 7 Several courts observed that, during this amendment
process, Congress gave no indication that it intended Section
2 to apply to felon disenfranchisement laws. 208 Based on this
observation, such courts reason that the absence of a
statement is evidence that Congress did not intend Section 2
when one statutory section includes particular language that is omitted in
another section of the same Act, it is presumed that Congress acted
intentionally and purposely." Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438,
439-40 (2002). Since courts taking this approach add Section 4(c)'s language
and purpose into Section 2, they violate this fundamental rule.
204. See Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287, 1306 n.27 (11th Cir.
2003) (arguing that Section 2 applies nationally to prohibit a broader range of
practices than the "tests and devices" covered by Section 4).
205. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 319-20.
206. Id. (describing the bills as proposed).
207. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006).
208. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 320; Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214,
1234 (11th Cir. 2005); Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 128 (2d Cir. 2004).
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to encompass felon disenfranchisement statutes °.2 9  Again,
this conclusion is not necessarily true. One could understand
the absence of an express statement that such laws are
included as evidence that Congress already understood felon
disenfranchisement laws to be covered. Therefore, the
absence of a statement that Congress intended Section 2 to
apply to felon disenfranchisement laws is not conclusive
evidence that Congress did not understand Section 2 to cover
such laws.
Additionally, the Hayden court understood the
congressional acts of passing a felon disenfranchisement law
for the District of Columbia, 21 ° allowing a criminal conviction
as a basis for removing names from eligible voter lists,21 and
directing states to remove disenfranchised felons from eligible
voter lists21 2 as evidence that Congress does not believe
Section 2 covers felon disenfranchisement laws.21 3
Significantly, these acts also support the assertion that
Congress actually understands Section 2 to cover felon
disenfranchisement statutes. More specifically, a conclusion
based on these acts ignores the possibility that Congress
understands that felon disenfranchisement laws applied
without racial bias do not violate Section 2 and those applied
with such racial bias violate Section 2.
Despite arguments to the contrary, Congress made a
clear statement in the language of Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act that it intends to include felon disenfranchisement
statutes. Section 2's language is extremely broad.21 4
Furthermore, the method of establishing a violation is all-
encompassing. 215  Broad language coupled with an all-
encompassing "totality of the circumstances test" indicates
that Congress contemplated a situation where a law, such as
a felon disenfranchisement statute, could interact with racial
bias in the criminal justice system to deny minorities the
209. See Hayden, 449 F.3d at 320-21; Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1234; Muntaqim,
366 F.3d at 128.
210. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 320.
211. Id. at 322.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006) (banning any voting qualification that
denies the right to vote on account of race).
215. See id. § 1973(b) (providing that a violation is established based on the
totality of the circumstances).
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right to vote on account of their race.216
Based on the foregoing, the requirements of the clear
statement rule are not satisfied. A remedy that does not
require invalidation of the felon disenfranchisement statute
avoids constitutional conflicts. Moreover, Congress already
made a clear statement of inclusion for such statutes with the
broad language of Section 2. Notwithstanding this
conclusion, others object to Section 2's application to felon
disenfranchisement statutes because, as a practical matter, it
requires the use of disparate impact statistics to demonstrate
vote denial on account of race.217
V. PROPOSAL: How Do WE Fix IT?
Since constitutional conflicts arise when litigants seek
the invalidation of felon disenfranchisement statutes under
Section 2, an alternative remedy is necessary. Instead of
seeking to invalidate the felon disenfranchisement laws,
litigants should seek re-enfranchisement individually by
proving that racial bias in the criminal justice system
resulted in their individual felony conviction. Such a remedy
allows states to disenfranchise felons in a non-discriminatory
manner while affording litigants a remedy under the Voting
Rights Act because it avoids the constitutional conflicts and
the effects of the clear statement rule. Furthermore, the
words "any citizen"218 indicate that the plain language of
Section 2 contemplates an individual remedy.
Although seeking individual reinstatement of the right to
vote avoids constitutional concerns, proving that an
individual felony conviction resulted from racial bias in the
criminal justice system remains difficult because direct
evidence of discrimination is rarely available. Therefore,
litigants must rely on statistical evidence in a similar manner
to the proposed Racial Justice Act.219 To be consistent with
216. See Hayden, 449 F.3d at 358-59 (Parker, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the broad language of Section 2 is a clear statement by Congress that it
intended felon disenfranchisement laws to be covered by Section 2).
217. E.g., Farrakhan v. Washington, 359 F.3d 1116, 1117-19 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (criticizing the use of statistical evidence to prove vote
denial claims).
218. § 1973(a).
219. See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 529-33 (advocating for the passage of
the Racial Justice Act, which allowed for proof of discrimination in death
penalty sentences through the use of statistics).
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other areas of discrimination, individual litigants seeking to
have their right to vote reinstated should prove a pattern of
felony convictions in the jurisdiction of their own conviction
which cannot be explained by any reason other than racial
discrimination.220  Although relevant, showing that the
criminal justice system convicts minorities of felonies more
often than whites should not be enough.221 Litigants should
show racial bias in their particular felony conviction.
For example, litigants could compare cases in their
jurisdiction with substantially similar facts to see if a
disparity exists in prosecutor charging decisions. Such an
inquiry would focus on whether prosecutors charge minorities
with more serious crimes than whites on substantially similar
facts. Additionally, litigants could demonstrate a disparity in
sentences between minorities and whites that would make
their convictions felonies. Of course, all statistical evidence
must take into account factors that may aggravate or
mitigate such disparities. Ultimately, litigants must produce
enough evidence to support an inference of racial bias in their
particular conviction.
Significantly, the use of statistics to demonstrate racial
bias in the criminal justice system is consistent with an
accepted procedure in discrimination cases. For example, in
Smith v. City of Jackson, the United States Supreme Court
held that disparate impact evidence is sufficient to establish a
claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.222
Perhaps more importantly, Section 2 contemplates the use of
such evidence in the "totality of the circumstances test.
223
Although seeking individual reinstatement of the right to
vote alleviates constitutional issues and affords felons a
remedy when the felon disenfranchisement law denies their
220. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266 (1977).
221. In fact, this is a difficult claim to prove through statistics. See
Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45987, at *29 (E.D. Wash. 2006)
(granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment because the lack of
evidence of racial discrimination in the electoral process counterbalanced the
evidence of racial bias in the criminal justice system).
222. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005) (concluding that a
disparate impact claim existed under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act).
223. § 1973(b). In addition, this remedy under Section 2 is preferable to a
challenge under the Equal Protection Clause because Section 2 does not require
proof of a discriminatory purpose. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.
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right to vote because of their race, a few concerns arise. First,
individual claims do not promote judicial economy. However,
recognizing such a claim promotes the policy behind the
Voting Rights Act by ridding the country of racial
discrimination in voting.224 Second, a concern arises that
allowing an individual claim will result in the end of felon
disenfranchisement laws. Such a concern is unfounded
because permitting an individual claim still allows states to
disenfranchise felons unless the litigant can prove
discrimination.225 Finally, concerns over the reliability or
allowance of statistical evidence are unfounded in light of the
United States Supreme Court's approval of such evidence.226
VI. CONCLUSION: HAVE YOUR CAKE AND EAT IT Too
Reconciling the disagreement among the circuits requires
litigants to seek an alternative remedy. In seeking to
establish a claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act for
felon disenfranchisement statutes that deny the right to vote
because of race, litigants should seek individual re-
enfranchisement rather than seeking to invalidate the felon
disenfranchisement law. Doing so avoids constitutional
concerns about altering the balance between the state and
federal governments. Accordingly, the clear statement rule
would be inapplicable. To prove such a claim in the absence
of direct evidence of racial bias, litigants must focus on
specific statistical disparity evidence to support the inference
that the differences result from racial bias. Significantly,
with over two million African Americans disenfranchised and
Latinos also disproportionately affected,227 this claim could
224. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966).
225. Others may be concerned that an individual remedy allows felons
another means to challenge their convictions. However, defendants must make
most racial challenges before trial. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
83-99 (1986) (holding that prosecutors cannot use peremptory challenges to
exclude jurors solely because of race and detailing the procedure to challenge a
prosecutor's decision before trial). Moreover, this remedy does not deny that the
litigant committed a crime. The remedy only re-enfranchises plaintiffs and does
not overturn convictions. Thus, it merely examines whether race played a
substantial role in the litigant's felony conviction and disenfranchisement. In
fact, this remedy reinforces the United States Supreme Court's holding that
states cannot use felon disenfranchisement as a mechanism to discriminate
based on race. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985).
226. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 232.
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have a substantial impact on the outcome of close elections.
Most importantly, permitting this type of vote denial claim
under Section 2 allows the Voting Rights Act to achieve its
purpose of ridding the country of racial discrimination in
voting.
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